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Context and importance
Russian disinformation has generated considerable interest over the last decade, and 
especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. NATO Commander General Philip 
Breedlove said that Russia today is waging “the most amazing information warfare 
blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare.”1 
Despite General Breedlove’s assertion, continuity rather than change characterises 
Russia’s current disinformation operations. The German webpage, Deutsche Welle, 
noted the recent Russian propaganda push is “reminiscent of the Cold War KGB 
efforts.”2  Anton Nosik, a popular Russian blogger, says, “the Kremlin is falling back 
on a time-honoured strategy in its propaganda war.”3  Russian observer Maria 
Snegovaya says that current Russian information warfare is “fundamentally based 
on older, well-developed and documented Soviet techniques.”4  Emphasising the 
Soviet roots of today’s Russian disinformation, Snegovaya argues that “the novelty 
of Russia’s information warfare is overestimated.”5
Critical overview of policies
Defining the topic is key to a critical appraisal of the policy. Active measures, 
reflexive control, propaganda and disinformation are inter-related disciplines. Active 
measures in the Soviet era included reflexive control, media manipulation, forgeries 
and occasional murders.6  Disinformation plays a role in all of these. Russian 
observer Timothy Thomas defines reflexive control as “a means of conveying to a 
partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily 
make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action.”7  Czech 
defector Ladislav Bittman defined disinformation as “a carefully constructed false 
message leaked into an opponent’s communication system to deceive the decision-
making elite or the public.”8  Richard Schultz and Roy Goodson, in Dezinformatsia, 
emphasise covert disinformation, something Russia still uses today.9  Russia seeks 
not so much to leverage its disinformation to convince, but to use it to “pollute” the 
information environment and thus create enough doubt to momentarily paralyse 
decision-makers when evaluating Russia’s actions. 
The Soviet experience with disinformation can be divided into two theatres: 
offensive disinformation, which sought to influence decision-makers and public 
opinion abroad and defensive, which sought to influence Soviet citizens. This study 
will examine Soviet offensive and defensive disinformation and compare it to 
Russian offensive and defensive disinformation.
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Soviet offensive disinformation involved planting falsehoods believable only by 
those predisposed to believe in conspiracy theories, or tricking those inimical to 
Soviet interests. An example will illustrate the nature of Soviet disinformation. 
A Soviet disinformation operation called Operation Infektion was both of long 
duration and quite successful. This operation was intended to plant the lie that 
AIDS had been developed by the CIA. In this case, the story was planted in an 
obscure Indian newspaper. The KGB fed Dr. Jakob Segal the idea, and encouraged 
him to spread the story. Segal played to perfection the role Lenin described as 
being a “useful idiot,” maintaining the story even after Soviet authorities publicly 
denied the truth of it.10  Here is a key difference between Soviet disinformation 
and today’s Russian disinformation: ultimately, Soviets would defend the truth, 
when Soviet policy required it. 
A second offensive disinformation technique was murder of opponents overseas. 
Assassinations abroad had disinformational components. For example, the NKVD 
famously killed Leon Trotsky in Mexico in 1940 and the KGB killed Ukrainian 
dissidents Lev Rebet and Stepan Bandera in West Germany in 1957 and 1959,11 
and Romanian dissident Noel Bernard in 1981.12  The KGB apparently kidnapped 
or killed Nikolai Artamonov-Shadrin, a Soviet defector, in Austria in 1975, which 
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had a clear informational message to prospective defectors: “do not double cross 
the Soviets, or you’ll end up like Shadrin.” Cleverly, it had a double benefit, the 
Soviet magazine Literaturnaya Gazeta alleged that the CIA had killed Shadrin 
because he wanted to return to the USSR.13  Thus, gullible people in the USSR 
would believe the CIA had killed a man just because he wanted to go home, and 
cynical observers, who knew the KGB’s ways, would get the reverse message: the 
KGB pays back those who cross them.14 
Soviet defensive disinformation also consisted of less violent means. The Soviets 
were intent on propagandising the Soviet population. To keep out alternative 
news, the Soviets periodically jammed Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty.15  The Soviet citizenry were quite cynical about their government’s 
disinformation, however. The two most important Soviet newspapers were 
Pravda (Truth) and Izvestia (News). Soviets would joke that there was no news in 
Truth and no truth in News.16
Continuity between the Soviet era and today should hardly surprise us. 
Litvenenko and Felshtinsky show that even though the KGB was outlawed in 
the Russian Federation, the operators remained and merely changed the name 
of the organisation for which they worked. Putin himself is acknowledged to be 
a KGB veteran, and “siloviki” (security force veterans) wield enormous influence 
in Putin’s Russia.17 
The continuities of today’s Russian offensive disinformation are noteworthy. 
Snegovaya argues that “[t]he main principles and approaches the Russian 
government utilises [in disinformation] today were taken from Soviet toolkits.”18 
Ben Nimmo characterises them as “dismiss, distort, distract, and dismay.”19 
When information inimical to Russian interests appears, Russian leaders dismiss 
it. See, for example, early Russian denials that Russian soldiers were involved 
in Crimea. If the information persists, Russian spokesmen distort it. Russia 
belatedly admitted that Russians are in Crimea, but they had been soldiers 
already legally stationed there or later, in Donbas, were “volunteers.” If the 
derogatory information still remains, the Russian solution is to distract attention 
away. In Ukraine, Russia repeatedly distracted attention from their invasion of 
Donbas with the stories that “Ukrainians are fascists.” If all else fails, a Russian 
public figure will issue some public statement designed to dismay the audience 
abroad. Russian “Doctor of Military Science,”20  Konstantin Sivkov suggested 
Russia consider using nuclear weapons to set off the Yellowstone super-volcano 
or trigger the San Andreas fault.21
One discontinuity today, however, is that Russians do not aim to preserve 
the credibility of the Russian government’s narrative in Western eyes.22  If 
Russian disinformation can convince some westerners of the truth of Russian 
disinformational themes, so much the better, but Russia will settle for a more 
modest goal. They want to undermine the credibility of the media, especially the 
internet, as a medium itself in western eyes. Russian blogger Anton Nosik calls 
this “internet pollution.”23  The Russian government aims for the more modest 
goal of making people abroad believe that the internet is simply informational 
chaos, utterly unreliable. A quick survey of the comments section of almost any 
on-line story involving Russia will demonstrate the truth of this. Russia-watcher 
Catherine Fitzpatrick, says “trolls inhibit informed debate by using crude dialogue 
to change ‘the climate of discussion.’” Fitzpatrick observes that “if you show up 
at The Washington Post or New Republic sites, where there’s an article that’s 
critical of Russia, and you see that there are 200 comments that sound like they 
were written by 12-year-olds, then you just don’t bother to comment.”24  Peter 
Pomerantsev says, “the point of this new propaganda is not to persuade anyone, 
but to keep the viewer hooked and distracted—to disrupt Western narratives 
rather than provide a counternarrative.”25  This is different from the Cold War 
during which the Soviet actually tried to convince foreign audiences.
Today’s Russkii Mir is smaller than the Soviet world. Soviet communist and 
anti-imperialist ideology, in its heyday, sold well in sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America in a way that Putin’s pan-Slavism does not. The Russkii Mir does 
not go far beyond the borders of the old Soviet Union. While anti-imperialism 
is widespread today, it is diffused, ideologically less coherent than Soviet 
communism, and more difficult for the Russian government to sell itself as 
genuinely anti-imperialist, especially when the Russian Federation is pretty 
clearly engaging in imperialism in Donbas, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Even the 
security forces operate in a more restricted area. In the Cold War, the KGB was 
happy to kill dissidents abroad. Today’s FSB henchmen generally restrict their 
killings of opposition figures to the Russian territory.26  This is a key difference 
from the Soviet era.
In defensive terms, Russia also follows Soviet traditions, albeit with new 
technology. Instead of jamming foreign radio broadcasts, the Russian government 
attempts to block internet protocol addresses.27  Most Russians get their news 
from television and most of them believe what they see.28  Putin and his friends 
own most Russian media.29  The Russian government owns Russia One and a 
51% interest in Channel One. Gazprom owns NTV.30  The key difference between 
the Cold War and today is the credibility Russians attach to their own media.31 
In the near abroad, Russian propaganda in the Russian language targets Russian 
speakers. At times Russian media does not just “spin” the truth. It creates a 
whole new reality.32  For example, Russian news media presented the story that a 
Russian boy had been crucified in Slaviansk. Yevgeny Feldman of Novaya Gazeta 
and Alan Cullison of The Wall Street Journal were in Sloviansk shortly after the 
incident and found neither evidence nor witnesses.33  When confronted with the 
truth, a Russian official responded that ratings were what matters.34 
Recommendations
The European Union’s External Action Service East Strategic Communications 
Task Force produces a weekly Strategic Communications Russian Disinformation 
Digest. This is an excellent input into a western response to Russian 
disinformation. The EU should more widely publicise this product.
Russians in the former Soviet Union generally turn to Russian language media for 
news. Too often, this means media with the Kremlin viewpoint. Latvia and Estonia 
have both have started broadcasting in the Russian language to the portions of 
their populations that speak only or primarily Russian. The government of the 
Netherlands is helping fund independent Russian-language journalism.35  This is 
a positive development and should be continued and expanded, if possible. This 
may be an opportunity for pooling and sharing of resources.
Unilateral national Strategic Communications or “Influence Operations” policies 
are of limited use. Russia has unity of effort in its disinformation programme. 
A series of western national responses may be disjointed, uncoordinated and 
ultimately of limited effect. NATO has a Strategic Communications Centre of 
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Excellence, but it lacks “teeth.” To be effective, strategic communications, or 
at least their themes and messages, must be noticed by target audiences. To 
be noticed requires “influence operations forces,” a group of people and or 
organisations whose job it is to get the truth of the western perspective out 
there. The Russian government does this for the purposes of disinformation with 
the trolls of the Internet Research Agency,36  and volunteers from various Russian 
nationalist organisations.37  NATO should do this, in Russian and on Russian 
media, for the purposes of good. This may not be easy. Russian trolls spread 
“internet pollution” around the web, but the West has the advantage of having 
truth on its side.
Finally, the Alliance (or its member nations) needs to have a non-attributable 
influence operations capability. The Russian government wants to limit access 
of Russian citizens to any but the Kremlin narrative. They have even gone so far 
as to ban foreign ownership of media.38  To be attributable to the West means 
perhaps being banned by the Russian government. In such an environment, non-
attributable influence operations, to get alternative views to Russian citizens, 
may be the only way to get alternative views of current events to Russians. 
Russian disinformation relies heavily on its Soviet antecedents. The Russian 
government has, however, updated its means of delivery and isolating Russians 
from outside views. Defeating today’s Russian disinformation requires a 
coordinated and pervasive response. It can be defeated, but this will require 
persistence.
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